Posts filed under 'nova ordem mundial - nova era'

Negros defendem fim do Dia do Mestiço

 O I Encontro da População Negra e das Comunidades de Terreiro de Roraima, realizado de 15 a 16 de setembro em Boa Vista, aprovou Carta que defende “Instituição do 20 de novembro como feriado Municipal/ Estadual e Federal e pelo fim do dia do mestiço criado no Estado do Amazonas e em Roraima”. A Carta está disponível no site do Governo Lula: https://www.planalto.gov.br/Consea/static/documentos/Outros/Carta_Roraima.pdf

Add comment 23 23UTC Junho 23UTC 2009

A moda de casamento gay já chegou à África

Essa vem do El Pais de madrid.
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“No sólo la Iglesia católica es contraria al matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo. La anglicana, al menos en África, también se muestra contraria. A las amenazas de un cisma por el ordenamiento de un obispo gay, el prelado de Nigeria Peter Akinola ha añadido una amenaza mucho más general.
En una carta enviada a los parlamentarios en la que pide que se ilegalice la posibilidad de que los gays y lesbianas se casen, Akinola añade que quienes asistan a una de estas ceremonias -aunque sean simbólicas- sean castigados con un año de cárcel. Los contrayentes deberán pasar cinco años en prisión, según el obispo. “El mismo matrimonio homosexual, aparte de ser impío, es antibíblico, poco natural, no rentable, malsano, incultural y antinigeriano. Esto es una perversión, una desviación y una aberración que es capaz de engendrar el holocausto moral y social en este país”, dice la carta del obispo.”

Add comment 20 20UTC Março 20UTC 2009

Gorbachev e a nova ordem mundial

WHAT NEXT?

A new international agenda

Published: January 1, 2009

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The year 2008 has been indelibly marked by the global financial crisis. No one predicted its outbreak or its scale; I don’t think anyone knows when and how it might end.

It is already clear that initial reassuring statements about it were irresponsible. In the coming months, the world, and world politics, will be severely tested.

Searching for ways out of the crisis will be a difficult, agonizing process. Not all early efforts were effective. This first failure in the functioning of our fully globalized world caught us by surprise, largely unprepared.

As I read the reports from the July Group of 8 summit meeting in Japan, it is amazing that just a couple months before the crisis erupted, world leaders seemed unaware of warning tremors. The summit was a routine gathering. Its very format – the way it was prepared and conducted – seems outdated. We need a new vision of global political leadership, a new willingness to work together in this globalized world. Politicians are lagging behind the events.

The crisis in the Caucasus in early August was a bolt from the blue. Any war, even a short one, is always a failure of politics and policy. The Georgian leadership’s military misadventure spelled disaster for thousands of Ossetians, Georgians and Russians; it also highlighted the absence of an effective security system in Europe for preventing and resolving conflicts.

Trouble hovers over other continents, too. Civil strife in Congo, Sudan and elsewhere in Africa has cost thousands of lives. The terrorist attacks on Mumbai were more than just a tragic reminder of the threat posed by terrorism: They also raised the issue of the responsibility of the state on whose territory this large-scale attack had been prepared. The situation in Afghanistan seems dismal. The Middle East remains a tinderbox. On top of it all, piracy has made a comeback, straight out of the dark ages.

The flows of migrants, social unrest in many countries (including some that are far from poor), the recent problems with contaminated food supplies, massive human rights violations – the list of the world’s ills can go on and on.

There is an increasing sense of a world in turmoil, further aggravated by the crisis of the world economy.

Talking to people in different countries, again and again I hear these questions: What is happening? What is in store? Why have the world’s political leaders failed to address effectively the old and new threats?

These are legitimate questions. To answer them, we must look at the underlying causes of recent events.

I am convinced that the root cause of the current widespread upheaval is the inability and even unwillingness of political leaders to correctly evaluate the situation after the end of the Cold War and jointly chart a new course.

The “winner’s complex” – the fanfare of triumph sounded by the West after the Soviet Union left the international arena – obscured the fact that the end of the Cold War was not a victory for one side or one ideology. It was instead a common achievement and a common challenge, a call for major change.

But why change if, as Western politicians believed, all was fine? They would continue to lead the rest of the world with their unfailing doctrine of free markets and alliances like NATO, which were ready and eager to assume responsibility for peace in Europe and beyond.

Payback came in 2008.

We will likely continue to pay for misguided thinking in the years to come, unless we have the courage to look at things honestly and rethink our approach to world affairs.

Throughout the world, there is a clamor for change. That desire was evident in November, in an event that could become both a symbol of this need for change and a real catalyst for that change. Given the special role the United States continues to play in the world, the election of Barack Obama could have consequences that go far beyond that country.

The American people have had their say; now all will depend on whether the new president and his team measure up to the challenge.

The U.S. presidential election was followed by another consequential event: The G-20 summit meeting in Washington foreshadowed a new format of global leadership, bringing together the countries responsible for the future of the world economy. And more than just the economy is at stake.

In and of itself, the fact that the G-8 leaders were joined as equal partners by the leaders of China, India and Brazil and almost a dozen other countries was a recognition, perhaps a reluctant one, that the economic and political balance in the world had changed. It is now a given that a world with a single power center, in any shape or guise, is no longer possible. The global challenge of a financial and economic tsunami can only be met by working together.

A new concept is emerging for addressing the crisis at the national and international levels. The steps now being contemplated seem better suited to the needs of a global world than the previous approach, based on the hope that the market will eventually take care of itself.

If current ideas for reforming the world’s financial and economic institutions are consistently implemented, that would suggest we are finally beginning to understand the importance of global governance. Such governance would render the economy more rational and more humane.

This is a daunting challenge, not only to the world’s economy. Yet it can be met. We need to encourage equitable dialogue, democratize relations among nations and push back militaristic tendencies in politics and thinking. This amounts to a new agenda for international politics.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, is president of the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies in Moscow.

Add comment 8 08UTC Março 08UTC 2009

Henry A. Kissinger prega a nova ordem mundial

APRÈS LE DÉLUGE

The chance for a new world order

Published: January 12, 2009

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As the new U.S. administration prepares to take office amid grave financial and international crises, it may seem counterintuitive to argue that the very unsettled nature of the international system generates a unique opportunity for creative diplomacy.

That opportunity involves a seeming contradiction. On one level, the financial collapse represents a major blow to the standing of the United States. While American political judgments have often proved controversial, the American prescription for a world financial order has generally been unchallenged. Now disillusionment with the United States’ management of it is widespread.

At the same time, the magnitude of the debacle makes it impossible for the rest of the world to shelter any longer behind American predominance or American failings.

Every country will have to reassess its own contribution to the prevailing crisis. Each will seek to make itself independent, to the greatest possible degree, of the conditions that produced the collapse; at the same time, each will be obliged to face the reality that its dilemmas can be mastered only by common action.

Even the most affluent countries will confront shrinking resources. Each will have to redefine its national priorities. An international order will emerge if a system of compatible priorities comes into being. It will fragment disastrously if the various priorities cannot be reconciled.

The nadir of the existing international financial system coincides with simultaneous political crises around the globe. Never have so many transformations occurred at the same time in so many different parts of the world and been made globally accessible via instantaneous communication. The alternative to a new international order is chaos.

The financial and political crises are, in fact, closely related partly because, during the period of economic exuberance, a gap had opened up between the economic and the political organization of the world.

The economic world has been globalized. Its institutions have a global reach and have operated by maxims that assumed a self-regulating global market.

The financial collapse exposed the mirage. It made evident the absence of global institutions to cushion the shock and to reverse the trend. Inevitably, when the affected publics turned to their national political institutions, these were driven principally by domestic politics, not considerations of world order.

Every major country has attempted to solve its immediate problems essentially on its own and to defer common action to a later, less crisis-driven point. So-called rescue packages have emerged on a piecemeal national basis, generally by substituting seemingly unlimited governmental credit for the domestic credit that produced the debacle in the first place – so far without more than stemming incipient panic.

International order will not come about either in the political or economic field until there emerge general rules toward which countries can orient themselves.

In the end, the political and economic systems can be harmonized in only one of two ways: by creating an international political regulatory system with the same reach as that of the economic world; or by shrinking the economic units to a size manageable by existing political structures, which is likely to lead to a new mercantilism, perhaps of regional units.

A new Bretton Woods-kind of global agreement is by far the preferable outcome. America’s role in this enterprise will be decisive. Paradoxically, American influence will be great in proportion to the modesty in our conduct; we need to modify the righteousness that has characterized too many American attitudes, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

That seminal event and the subsequent period of nearly uninterrupted global growth induced too many to equate world order with the acceptance of American designs, including our domestic preferences.

The result was a certain inherent unilateralism – the standard complaint of European critics – or else an insistent kind of consultation by which nations were invited to prove their fitness to enter the international system by conforming to American prescriptions.

Not since the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy half a century ago has a new administration come into office with such a reservoir of expectations. It is unprecedented that all the principal actors on the world stage are avowing their desire to undertake the transformations imposed on them by the world crisis in collaboration with the United States.

The extraordinary impact of the president-elect on the imagination of humanity is an important element in shaping a new world order. But it defines an opportunity, not a policy.

The ultimate challenge is to shape the common concern of most countries and all major ones regarding the economic crisis, together with a common fear of jihadist terrorism, into a common strategy reinforced by the realization that the new issues like proliferation, energy and climate change permit no national or regional solution.

The new administration could make no worse mistake than to rest on its initial popularity. The cooperative mood of the moment needs to be channeled into a grand strategy going beyond the controversies of the recent past.

The charge of American unilateralism has some basis in fact; it also has become an alibi for a key European difference with America: that the United States still conducts itself as a national state capable of asking its people for sacrifices for the sake of the future, while Europe, suspended between abandoning its national framework and a yet-to-be-reached political substitute, finds it much harder to defer present benefits.

Hence its concentration on soft power. Most Atlantic controversies have been substantive and only marginally procedural; there would have been conflict no matter how intense the consultation. The Atlantic partnership will depend much more on common policies than agreed procedures.

The role of China in a new world order is equally crucial. A relationship that started on both sides as essentially a strategic design to constrain a common adversary has evolved over the decades into a pillar of the international system.

China made possible the American consumption splurge by buying American debt; America helped the modernization and reform of the Chinese economy by opening its markets to Chinese goods.

Both sides overestimated the durability of this arrangement. But while it lasted, it sustained unprecedented global growth. It mitigated as well the concerns over China’s role once China emerged in full force as a fellow superpower. A consensus had developed according to which adversarial relations between these pillars of the international system would destroy much that had been achieved and benefit no one. That conviction needs to be preserved and reinforced.

Each side of the Pacific needs the cooperation of the other in addressing the consequences of the financial crisis. Now that the global financial collapse has devastated Chinese export markets, China is emphasizing infrastructure development and domestic consumption.

It will not be easy to shift gears rapidly, and the Chinese growth rate may fall temporarily below the 7.5 percent that Chinese experts have always defined as the line that challenges political stability. America needs Chinese cooperation to address its current account imbalance and to prevent its exploding deficits from sparking a devastating inflation.

What kind of global economic order arises will depend importantly on how China and America deal with each other over the next few years. A frustrated China may take another look at an exclusive regional Asian structure, for which the nucleus already exists in the Asean-plus-three concept.

At the same time, if protectionism grows in America or if China comes to be seen as a long-term adversary, a self-fulfilling prophecy may blight the prospects of global order.

Such a return to mercantilism and 19th-century diplomacy would divide the world into competing regional units with dangerous long-term consequences.

The Sino-American relationship needs to be taken to a new level. The current crisis can be overcome only by developing a sense of common purpose. Such issues as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, energy and the environment demand strengthened political ties between China and the United States.

This generation of leaders has the opportunity to shape trans-Pacific relations into a design for a common destiny, much as was done with trans-Atlantic relations in the immediate postwar period – except that the challenges now are more political and economic than military.

Such a vision must embrace as well such countries as Japan, Korea, India, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, whether as part of trans-Pacific structures or, in regional arrangements, dealing with special subjects as energy, proliferation and the environment.

The complexity of the emerging world requires from America a more historical approach than the insistence that every problem has a final solution expressible in programs with specific time limits not infrequently geared to our political process.

We must learn to operate within the attainable and be prepared to pursue ultimate ends by the accumulation of nuance.

An international order can be permanent only if its participants have a share not only in building but also in securing it. In this manner, America and its potential partners have a unique opportunity to transform a moment of crisis into a vision of hope.

Henry A. Kissinger served as national security adviser and as secretary of state in the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Distributed by Tribune Media Services.

1 comment 8 08UTC Março 08UTC 2009

A Nova Ordem Mundial – Os 3 pilares e os três inimigos da Civilização ocidental

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Add comment 18 18UTC Fevereiro 18UTC 2009

continuação – o homem que quer dominar o mundo

> Alexander Dugin

Aleksandr Gelevich Dugin (Russian: Александр Гельевич Дугин) (Russian scholar, political activist, and founder of the contemporary Russian school of geopolitics often known as “Eurasianism”. He is often seen to be an advocate of National Bolshevism.

 

 

Dugin worked as a journalist before becoming involved in politics just after the fall of communism. He helped to write the political programme for the newly refounded Communist Party of the Russian Federation under the leadership of Gennady Zyuganov, producing a document that was more nationalist in tone than Marxist.

 

 

Dugin soon began publishing his own journal Elementy which initially began by praising Franco-Belgian neo-fascist Jean_Fran�ois Thiriart. He also sought an alliance with Alain de Benoist although the Frenchman was discouraged by Dugin’s vehement Russian nationalism. Consistently glorifying both Tsarist and Stalinist Russia, Elementy also revealed Dugin’s admiration for Heinrich Himmler and Julius Evola, to name but two. He also played a role in editing the weekly journal Dyen (The Day), a bastion of Russian anti-Semitism. Convinced that National Bolshevism needed its own political movement Dugin talked his close ally Eduard Limonov into leading a new group and so the National Bolshevik Front was born. Dugin then became a prominent member of National Bolshevik Party.

 

 

The Eurasia Party, founded by Dugin on the eve of George W. Bush’s visit to Russia at the end of May 2002, is said by some observers to enjoy financial and organizational support from Vladimir Putin’s presidential office. The Eurasia Party also is supported by the leaders of the Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Buddhist, and Jewish faiths in Russia, and the party hopes to play a key role in attempts to resolve the Iran. Dugin’s ideas, particularly those on “a Turkic-Slavic alliance in the Eurasian sphere” have recently become popular among certain nationalistic circles in Turkey.

 

 

One of the basic ideas that underpin his theories is that Moscow, Berlin, and Paris form a “natural” geopolitical axis, because a line or axis from Moscow to Berlin will pass through the vicinity of Paris if extended). Dugin’s theories foresee an eternal world conflict between land and sea, and hence, Dugin believes, the US and Russia. He says, “In principle, Eurasia and our space, the heartland Russia, remain the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution.” According to his 1997 book, The Basics of Geopolitics, “The new Eurasian empire will be constructed on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us. This common civilisational impulse will be the basis of a political and strategic union.”

 

 

What has made Dugin notorious is that his thought echoes Hitler’s in certain areas. For example, the second of the party’s principles is “Social Orientation.” This principle begins: “This is a euroasian economy, consisting of capitalism with a national soul and socialistic face”.

 

 

He is talking about capitalism based on a combination of nationalism with socialism: this at least resembles “national socialism”, or Nazism. His theories were banned during Soviet times for their links to Nazism. Nowadays, however, his theories have won broad acceptance within the Communist Party.

 

 

Dugin does have a healthy respect for Judaism. He is, however, anti-Zionist, which he regards as standing in contradiction to basic Talmudic principles. He also views Israel as a “strategic base for [the] militant Atlantism” promoted by the US and Britain.

 

 

Most recently he has criticized the “Euro-Atlantic” involvement in the Ukrainian presidential election as a scheme to create a “cordon sanitaire” around Russia, much like the British attempted after the first world war.

 

 

 

 

Dugin’s works

Absoliutnaia rodina, Arktogeia-tsentr (1999), ISBN 5818600033

Tampliery proletariata: natsional-bol�shevizm i initsiatsiia, Arktogeia (1997), ISBN 5859280173

Osnovy geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, Arktogeia (1997), ISBN 5859280181

Metafizika blagoi vesti: Pravoslavnyi ezoterizm, Arktogeia (1996), ISBN 5859280165

Misterii Evrazii, Arktogeia (1996), ISBN 5859280157

Konservativnaia revoliutsiia, Arktogeia (1994), ISBN 5859280130

1 comment 2 02UTC Fevereiro 02UTC 2009

A forma oriental coletivista de economia e sociedade moderna

Le journaliste David Brooks explique dans le quotidien International Herald Tribune la différence entre l’individualisme occidental et le collectivisme asiatique. “On peut établir une échelle mondiale avec, d’un côté, les sociétés les plus individualistes – comme les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne – et, de l’autre, les sociétés les plus collectivistes – comme la Chine et le Japon. … Les sociétés individualistes réussissent généralement mieux sur le plan économique. Notre histoire en Occident a connu le développement de la raison individuelle et de la conscience pendant la Renaissance et le siècle des Lumières mais aussi pendant la période prospère du capitalisme qui a suivi. … Mais … que se passe-t-il lorsque les sociétés collectivistes, particulièrement celles d’Asie, connaissent une véritable croissance économique et concurrencent l’Occident ? Une nouvelle sorte de conversation mondiale prend forme. La cérémonie d’ouverture à Pékin était un communiqué officiel de cette conversation. Elle faisait partie de l’affirmation de la Chine que le développement ne se fait pas uniquement grâce à des moyens occidentaux libéraux mais peut également être favorisé par des moyens orientaux et collectifs. … L’ascension de la Chine n’est pas simplement un événement économique. C’est également un événement culturel. L’idéal d’un collectif harmonieux pourrait bien se révéler aussi attirant que l’idéal du rêve américain. C’est certainement une idéologie utile pour des autocrates ambitieux.” International Herald Tribune, 13 août 2008

Add comment 4 04UTC Janeiro 04UTC 2009

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